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Banks, Financial Markets and International
Consumption Risk Sharing
Abstract
In this paper we empirically explore how characteristics of the domestic financial
system influence the international allocation of consumption risk using a sample of
OECD countries. Our results show that the extent of risk sharing achieved does
not depend on the overall development of the domestic financial system per se.
Rather, it depends on how the financial system is organized. Specifically, we find
that countries characterized by developed financial markets are less exposed to id-
iosyncratic risk, whereas the development of the banking sector contributes little
to the international diversification of consumption risk. We also find that countries
with market-based financial systems manage to share a significantly larger fraction
of their country-specific risk than bank-based economies.
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1 Introduction
How do countries deal with macroeconomic risk? In principle, countries should be able to
pool and diversify idiosyncratic, that is, country-specific, risk internationally and thereby
smooth consumption despite the occurrence of shocks. Although an extensive literature
shows that the extent of consumption risk sharing between countries is relatively low (see
e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; Lewis, 1999; Obstfeld, 1994; Backus et al., 1992), the
precise channels through which risk is shared are less clear.
In this paper we study the role of domestic financial systems, by which we mean
financial markets and banks, for the international sharing of consumption risk. The
domestic financial system may be relevant for the international allocation of risk since
it should provide instruments to share risk across countries. However, the provision of
appropriate instruments may depend on how developed the financial system is and on
how it is organized.
In general, countries with more developed financial systems are more likely to provide
the appropriate instruments to share risk across borders. Thus, the overall development
of the domestic financial system may determine the extent to which idiosyncratic risk can
be diversified across countries. However, financial systems may be rather heterogeneous
in terms of the development of the individual sectors. In other words, an overall highly
developed financial system may be the result of a developed banking sector or sophisti-
cated financial markets or both. If banks and financial markets are distinct channels for
risk sharing then the degree of risk sharing achieved may in fact depend on the develop-
ment of financial markets and of banks, respectively, and not on the overall development
of the domestic financial system per se. In this case, it also follows that the extent
of risk sharing may depend on which element of the financial system is dominant. In
market-based systems, financial markets are relatively more important than the banking
sector, whereas the opposite is true in countries which are better described as bank-based
financial systems.1 Thus, risk sharing may vary across these types of financial system.
Against this background we explore empirically how characteristics of the domestic
financial system influence the extent to which countries are able to share country-specific
1See Allen and Gale (2000) for a classification and a more detailed discussion of financial systems.
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risk internationally. Our results indicate that it is primarily the development of financial
markets which helps to share risk across countries. This result is in line with the idea that
financial markets provide the necessary instruments to trade and diversify risk. Moreover,
we find that banks play only a limited role for international risk sharing, which may be due
to a home bias in bank assets (see e.g. Vazquez and Garcia-Herrero, 2007). Thus, financial
markets and banks do not appear to be close substitutes for the international sharing of
consumption risk. Furthermore, we find that countries characterized by market-based
financial systems tend to be less exposed to idiosyncratic consumption risk than countries
with bank-based systems.
Our analysis is closely related to Sorensen et al. (2007) and Hoffmann and Shcherbakova
(2008) who argue that banks play an important role for the sharing of risk across US
states. Thus, although the banking sector in the US contributes to risk sharing across
states, banks do not appear to improve risk sharing across countries. The paper is also
closely related to Hoffmann and Nitschka (2008). They show that the securitization of
mortgage debt contributes significantly to risk sharing by making risk associated with
residential real estate tradable. Yet, our analysis takes a broader view by analyzing the
role of financial markets in general. Nevertheless, our results confirm that the tradability
of risk helps to reduce the exposure to country-specific shocks.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sketches why characteristics of the do-
mestic financial system may determine the degree of risk sharing and it summarizes the
four issues that we explore in the paper. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology
and the data set. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes and
concludes the paper.
2 The Domestic Financial System and Risk Sharing
In this section, we discuss how characteristics of the domestic financial system may in-
fluence the extent to which country-specific risk is shared internationally. Basically, con-
sumption risk can be diversified across countries via financial transactions. Consequently
risk sharing should be closely related to cross-border financial flows. Nevertheless, at a
somewhat deeper level, characteristics of the domestic financial system may ultimately
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determine how well countries can insure against idiosyncratic risk.
In general, it appears plausible that the instruments which are necessary to share risk
efficiently are more readily available in financial systems which are characterized by a
relatively high level of development. Thus, countries with developed financial systems
- in a broad sense - should be less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Yet, the overall level
of development does not take into account how the financial system is organized. In
principle, agents can insure against country-specific risk by holding diversified portfolios
consisting of assets which represent claims on a country’s GDP. If such assets are traded
on financial markets, risk essentially becomes tradable. Consequently, one would expect
that countries with more developed financial markets are able to share risk to a greater
extent, simply because risk is more tradable.
However, even if risk is not sufficiently tradable due to a lack of the appropriate
instruments or if direct financial market participation is limited, international risk sharing
may still occur indirectly through financial intermediaries. Consider for instance the case
where a country is hit by macroeconomic shocks which lead to fluctuations in income.
Although a substantial fraction of agents in the economy may not be able to smooth these
shocks via cross-border financial transactions, they may be able to smooth consumption
by either depositing funds at a bank or by borrowing from a bank. In other words, agents
share risk intranationally with banks.2 These, in turn, diversify risk across countries and
thereby reallocate risk internationally. A similar point is emphasized by Sorensen et al.
(2007) and Hoffmann and Shcherbakova (2008) who find that banks play an important
role for risk sharing between federal states in the US.
More generally, the international sharing of consumption risk may involve two stages.
At the first stage, risk is pooled within countries and then, at the second stage, risk is
diversified across countries. If risk is shifted from agents with limited access to inter-
national financial markets, e.g. households, to agents who can more easily participate
on international financial markets, as for instance banks, then the overall exposure to
country-specific risk may decline. In this sense, financial intermediaries may act as a
substitute for the tradability of risk.3
2Boot (2000) argues that banks increasingly provide risk sharing in a general sense, since the traditional
banking business has been declining over time.
3Note that in addition to financial intermediaries who diversify risk internationally on behalf of retail
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In short, risk is either shared directly via asset trade, or indirectly via intermediaries
such as banks. As long as banks and markets give rise to the same net foreign asset
position, that is, if intermediaries just replicate the net foreign asset position that results
from the direct trade of assets, the organization of the domestic financial system is largely
irrelevant. In this case banks and markets are essentially close substitutes for the inter-
national allocation of risk and therefore risk sharing depends only on the overall level of
development of the domestic financial system. However, this need not be the case and
therefore financial markets and banks may represent distinct channels of risk sharing.
So far, we have focused either on financial development in a broad sense, or on the
development of individual sectors of the financial system. The extent of risk sharing
may also depend on which element of the financial system is the most dominant, that is,
whether a country is better characterized as a market-based or as bank-based financial
system. Consider, for instance, two countries where financial markets are developed to a
similar extent. Suppose that in one of the countries banks are relatively more important
than markets in the sense that financial transactions are primarily conducted through
banks, whereas in the other country, markets are relatively more important than banks.
Clearly, if banks and financial markets represent distinct channels for risk sharing, then
the countries may achieve different levels of risk sharing despite the fact that they both
have financial markets with similar degrees of development. In short, the overall extent of
risk sharing may vary across countries characterized by different types of financial system.
Thus, whether banks and financial markets are indeed distinct channels for risk sharing
and which type of financial system leads to a lower exposure to risk, are both empirical
questions.
To sum up, the first issue we explore in the paper is whether countries with more
developed domestic financial systems are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Second, we
analyze if countries characterized by more developed financial markets manage to diversify
a larger fraction of their idiosyncratic risk. If macroeconomic risk cannot be traded to
customers, financial markets may provide a similar type of intermediation via investments in multinational
companies. Multinational companies typically acquire claims on the GDPs of foreign countries. Thus,
an agent who invests in a multinational company essentially purchases a diversified portfolio of claims
on foreign productive assets. Hence, in addition to ensuring that macroeconomic risk become tradable,
financial markets also allow to shift risk to agents with a readier access to international financial markets.
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a sufficient extent, financial intermediaries can still facilitate international risk sharing.
Therefore, the third issue we study is the role of banks for international risk sharing.
And finally, we directly test which type of financial system, market-based or bank-based,
provides more risk sharing.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.1 Empirical Strategy
To empirically evaluate the role of the domestic financial system for risk sharing we adopt
the framework advocated in Asdrubali et al. (1996) which has become the workhorse
approach to measure risk sharing. The standard risk sharing regression is based on the
benchmark of complete markets. Intuitively, under complete markets any idiosyncratic
influences are diversified away and therefore consumption should only react to global
factors, which affect all countries. More specifically, if markets are complete and if prefer-
ences of the representative agent are described by a constant relative risk aversion utility
function, then we should observe that: ∆ log cit = ∆ log cjt, where cit and cjt denote real
per capita consumption in countries i = 1, ..., N and j = 1, ..., N at time t. Thus, con-
sumption growth rates are equalized across countries (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996,
chapter 5, for a detailed derivation).
Since this condition for an optimal allocation has to hold for any two countries i and
j, it also has to hold between country i and the world average: ∆ log cit = ∆ log ct, where
ct is a population weighted average of real per capita consumption growth rates. That is,
under complete markets, consumption growth in each country should be equal to average
growth.
If full risk sharing is not feasible due to incomplete markets, then consumption growth
may depend on idiosyncratic variables, such as idiosyncratic income growth, ∆ log yit −
∆ log yt, where ∆ log yit is the growth rate of per capita output in country i and ∆ log yt
is the average per capita output growth rate across countries:
∆ log cit −∆ log ct = β(∆ log yit −∆ log yt), (1)
The left-hand-side of the equation is essentially the deviation from the benchmark of per-
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fect risk sharing, which is linked to idiosyncratic output growth on the right-hand-side.
If β = 0, then we have perfect risk sharing. In contrast, β = 1 corresponds to a complete
lack of risk sharing, that is, the autarky allocation. More generally, Asdrubali et al. (1996)
show that β can be interpreted as the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Put differently, β
measures the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks which are not shared internationally. Sim-
ilarly, 1 − β provides a measure of the extent of risk sharing. To empirically quantify
the extent of risk sharing, Asdrubali et al. (1996) run a panel regression of idiosyncratic
consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth:
∆c˜it = ζi + β∆y˜it + #it, (2)
where ∆c˜it = ∆ log cit − ∆ log ct and ∆y˜it = ∆ log yit − ∆ log yt, ζi denote country-fixed
effects and #it is the remainder error term.
To explore how the domestic financial system influences the exposure to idiosyncratic
shocks we follow Sorensen et al. (2007) and allow β in (2) to depend on variables which
proxy aspects of the financial system. More specifically, we parameterize β as
β = β0 + βFF + γtrend, (3)
where F denotes a proxy either for the overall development of the financial system, for the
development of financial markets and banks or for the type of the financial system. trend
is a time trend. Several studies find that risk sharing has increased over the last decades
due to deeper financial integration (see e.g. Artis and Hoffmann, 2008; Sorensen et al.,
2007). We include trend to control for this increase in risk sharing in a general way. To
specifically analyze the implications of financial integration we also estimate specifications
where we replace trend in (3) by a proxy variable for international asset trade.
Using the parameterization for β and (2) we obtain our estimating equation:
∆c˜it = ζi + (β0 + βFF + γtrend)∆y˜it + #it. (4)
So essentially we are adding interaction terms to capture the influence of the domestic
financial system for the dependence of country-specific consumption growth on country-
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specific output growth.4 Note that β0 is the average exposure to idiosyncratic risk and
βF measures the effect of F on the exposure.
3.2 Data
Our analysis is based on annual data from 23 OECD countries and covers the period 1988
- 2004, since some the financial system variable we use for our analysis are not available
for longer periods.5 The precise sample varies somewhat depending on the availability
of data for the individual countries. Real per capita consumption and real per capita
GDP are taken from the Penn World Tables, described in Heston et al. (2006), and are
measured in constant international prices. World aggregates are calculated as weighted
averages: yt =
∑23
i=1 !=j wityit and ct =
∑23
i=1 !=j witcit. The weights wit are calculated as
wit = popit/
∑23
i=1 !=j popit, where popit is the population of country i at time t.
To obtain proxy variables for the characteristics of the domestic financial system we
draw on the large literature studying finance and growth. Data on financial system
indicators are provided by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001).6 Specifically, we follow
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and use bank assets as a percentage of GDP as an
indicator for the development of the banking sector (bankit) and the ratio of stock market
capitalization to GDP to proxy the development of financial markets (marketit) in general.
Based on these two variables we construct two further indicators for the domestic financial
system: The first is a proxy for the overall level of the financial system’s development,
denoted by devit, which we calculate as devit = bankit+marketit. The second variable we
construct, systit, indicates the type of financial system which characterizes an economy.
This variable is calculated as the size of financial markets relative to the size of the banking
sector: systit = marketit/bankit. We interpret countries characterized by high values of
systit as being relatively more market-based economies.
4In addition to the interaction terms, we also include the variables contained in F directly in (4),
that is, not interacted with ∆y˜it. Although the coefficients on these variables are not of direct interest
for the analysis, the inclusion of these variables helps to avoid potential mis-specification. Further note,
that a Newey-West-HAC-robust Variance-Covariance matrix of the remainder error term !it is used in
the analysis. Thereby, a lag of 3 is chosen which roughly corresponds to T 1/3.
5Our sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
6The data are available at: http : //www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross Levine/Publications.htm
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The set of financial variables, F , thus consists of devit, marketit, bankit and systit.
These four variables are directly related to the four issues we explore in this paper: If
the overall level of development has a favorable impact on the degree of international
risk sharing, devit should enter significantly with a negative sign in (4) (i.e. βdev < 0); If
βmarket < 0, then larger financial markets lead to a lower exposure to country-specific risk;
Similarly, βbank < 0 indicates that countries with a larger banking sector are less exposed
to idiosyncratic income shocks. This result would be consistent with the interpretation
that banks diversify risk internationally on behalf of agents who do not participate on
financial markets directly; Finally if βsyst < 0, then we may conclude that market-based
economies are able to share a larger fraction of risk than bank-based economies.
To capture the effect of international financial transactions, we construct a measure
for total asset trade, FAit, as the sum of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities to GDP
(see Obstfeld, 2004). We interpret FAit as a proxy for international financial integration.
Data on foreign assets and liabilities are obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
and consist of foreign direct investment, equity and debt portfolio investment and financial
derivatives.
All variables, except trend, are logged to cope with potential outliers in the data.
Moreover, we subtract the means from the variables included in F , from FAit and also
from trend. Using de-meaned variables allows for a ready interpretation of the coefficients
on the interaction terms.
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations.
Note, that the correlations between FAit and marketit as well as devit are relatively
pronounced. In contrast, the correlation between bankit and FAit is rather low. These
correlations can be considered as an indication for the close relationship between a coun-
try’s domestic financial system and its international diversification of assets.
4 Estimation Results
Column (I) in Table 3 shows the results for the standard risk sharing equation augmented
with a time trend, but without the financial system variables. We see that the average
exposure to idiosyncratic risk is about 65 percent. Thus, countries are able to insure
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against approximately 35 percent of idiosyncratic fluctuations in output. Moreover, the
trend variable enters significantly with a negative sign, indicating a general increase in
the degree of risk sharing over time. This result is in line with the existing literature (see
e.g. Artis and Hoffmann, 2008).
The remaining columns of Table 3 show how devit, marketit, bankit, and systit influ-
ence the exposure to idiosyncratic fluctuations in output. We see from column (II) that
the interaction term involving devit enters with a negative sign. That is, high values of
devit tend to reduce the impact of idiosyncratic output growth on consumption growth.
However, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. Thus, column (II) pro-
vides only weak evidence in favor of the hypothesis that developed domestic financial
systems result in higher risk sharing.
Columns (III) and (IV) show how the development of financial markets and of banks
influence risk sharing. In contrast to the overall financial development, we see from column
(III) that countries with large financial markets are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. This
result confirms our expectation that the higher tradability of risk associated with large
and developed financial markets improves the ability to share risk across countries. The
effect of marketit is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful.
From a substantive point of view our results suggest that an increase in marketit by one
standard deviation (i.e, by 0.782; cf. Table 1) increases the degree of risk sharing by about
10 percentage points to 45 percent.7
Concerning the role of banks, column (IV) shows that bankit does not significantly
impact upon the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Thus, although large financial markets
foster risk sharing, banks do not appear to provide international diversification of con-
sumption risk. This conclusion is reinforced when we compare risk sharing across types
of financial systems. Column (V) shows that higher values of systit significantly reduce
the exposure to country-specific fluctuations in output growth.8 That is, relatively more
7Calculated as 0.657-0.124*0.782, based on column (III) in Table 3.
8Note, that in the specification in Column (V), we do not control for the overall level of development.
Since systit ignores the overall level of development, countries where the relative importance of banks
and markets is similar are treated similarly in this specification, although these countries may still differ
substantially with respect to their overall level of financial development. However, since our sample
consists only of OECD countries with relatively developed, albeit heterogeneous, financial systems, this
issue does not appear to be problematic. This interpretation is also supported by the insignificance of
devit in Column (I).
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market-based systems are less exposed to risk, which is consistent with the interpretation
that the tradability of risk in market-based systems is essential for risk sharing.
Thus, what matters for risk sharing is not financial development per se, but the devel-
opment of financial markets. Banks do not appear to be a substitute for the tradability
of risk. Moreover, market-based financial systems provide more risk sharing than bank-
based systems. The result that it is primarily the tradability of risk which helps to share
risk across countries is in line with Hoffmann and Nitschka (2008) who show that the
increased tradability of risk due to securitization has improved international risk shar-
ing. The limited influence of the banking sector on the extent to which countries are
exposed to shocks contrasts somewhat with the important role of banks for risk sharing
among US states documented by Sorensen et al. (2007). Thus, although banks foster
intranational risk sharing, they do not appear to improve the sharing of risk across bor-
ders. Interestingly, this interpretation is in line with the empirically documented home
bias in bank assets (see Vazquez and Garcia-Herrero, 2007) and also with the finding in
Buch and DeLong (2004) that cross-border bank mergers can only be partly explained by
diversification motives.
Yet, one might question our results with the argument that the proxies for the do-
mestic financial system pick up too much short-run volatility to allow for a structural
interpretation. For instance, stock market capitalization may be driven by price changes.
That is, a relatively large stock market capitalization may not only be an indication for
the development of financial markets, but may simply show that stock prices have strongly
increased. And since risk sharing may be higher in times of rising stock prices, we may
simply pick up the effect of stock prices instead of structural aspects of the financial
system.
To meet this concern, we re-estimate (4) with categorical indicators for the various
proxies of the domestic financial system.9 That is, we group countries according to the
characteristics of their financial systems. More specifically, we create a set of dummy
variables, DFi , where F is either dev, market, bank, or syst, which are equal to unity
9We also explore the cross-sectional stability of our estimates by conducting a country-jackknife anal-
ysis. Our conclusions are robust to dropping individual countries from the sample. Detailed results are
available upon request.
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if the mean value of the respective financial indicator variable for country i is above the
cross-country average. For example, Ddevi is defined as D
dev
i = 1 if 1/(T )
∑T
t=1 devit >
1/(NT )
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 devit, and D
dev
i = 0 otherwise. The dummies D
bank
i , D
market
i and D
syst
i
are defined analogously. Note that since the grouping of countries depends on averages
taken over time, we are much less likely to pick up any short run variation such as large
movements in stock prices. Again to account for a general increase in risk sharing over
time, we allow β to depend on a time trend which may now exert a different effect on risk
sharing across the groups of countries.:
β = β0 + βhFD
F
i + βlF (1−DFi ) + γhFDFi trend + γlF (1−DFi )trend, (5)
where h and l denote above and below cross-country average. From Table 4 we see
that our main conclusions remain unaltered. According to column (I), countries with a
more developed financial system are slightly less exposed to idiosyncratic risk, although
the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal (i.e. H0 : βhdev = βldev) cannot be
rejected. Nevertheless, column (II) shows that countries with an above average stock
market capitalization are exposed to about 55 percent of the idiosyncratic variation in
their outputs, whereas the exposure is about 80 percent for countries with below average
stock market capitalizations. In addition to this economically meaningful difference, the
null of equal exposures in both groups of countries is rejected. From column (III) we
see that the exposure to idiosyncratic risk appears to be even higher in countries with
large banking sectors, although the null of equal coefficients is not rejected. Finally,
column (IV) shows that countries characterized by a market-based financial system are
significantly less exposed to idiosyncratic risk.10
As a final step of our analysis, we now explore the impact of financial globalization
on risk sharing in somewhat greater detail. In the estimations reported so far, we have
included a time trend to take the impact of financial globalization into account. Although
this approach has the advantage to allow for a substantial amount of flexibility, it cap-
tures variations in risk sharing over time in a general sense. By replacing trend with our
proxy for foreign asset trade, FAit, in (4) we are able to analyze the impact of financial
10The market-based countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the U.S.
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globalization and integration more specifically. Since the domestic financial system and
foreign asset trade are likely to be closely interrelated, this extension provides a more de-
tailed picture of how the domestic financial system and international asset trade influence
international consumption risk sharing.
According to Table 5 the coefficient on the interaction term ∆y˜it ∗ FAit is negatively
signed and significant at standard levels in column (I). As expected, the degree of risk
sharing achieved rises with an increase in total asset trade. However, adding FAit changes
the significance of the interaction terms involving marketit and systit. Although columns
(III) and (V) indicate that an increase in marketit and systit reduces the exposure to
shocks, these variables are only significant at the 15 percent level. These results are not
entirely unexpected, since they may simply mirror the fact that domestic and foreign asset
trade are closely interrelated in financially integrated economies. Hence, the insignificance
of the interaction terms may just indicate that we are not able to distinguish the effects
of the domestic financial system on the one hand, and of FAit on the other hand.
To explore this point further, we now disentangle the effects of the domestic financial
system variables and foreign asset trade. In particular, we orthogonalize FAit and the
financial system variables by running the following regression:11
FAit = α0 + αFF + u
F
it , (6)
where F is either devit, marketit, bankit or systit. The estimated residual of this re-
gression, uˆFit , is by construction orthogonal to F and can therefore be interpreted as the
extent of foreign asset trade which is not related to the financial system variable under
consideration. Consequently, by substituting uˆFit for FAit in (4), we are able to distinguish
between the influence of the domestic financial system and the role of trade in foreign
assets.
The results are displayed in Table 6. We see that, devit, marketit and systit sig-
nificantly reduce the exposure to idiosyncratic output growth, which contrasts with the
results shown in Table 5 but reinforces our previous conclusions. Table 6 suggests that
the insignificance of the financial system variables in Table 5 was indeed due to the inter-
11See Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) for a similar approach.
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relationship between the financial system variables and FAit.
Note that uˆFit is negatively signed regardless of specification estimated. However,
this variable significantly increases the extent of risk sharing only in column (III) which
includes bankit. Hence, it appears that the banking sector and foreign asset trade represent
unrelated channels for risk sharing. That is, countries with a large banking sector are still
able to share risk via trade in foreign assets, but according to our results without the
banking sector as an intermediary. Again, this result suggests that the banking sector
plays only a limited role for the international sharing of consumption risk.
In contrast, the insignificance of uˆFit in column (II) implies that larger financial markets
tend to increase trade in assets domestically as well as across borders and thereby allow
to pool risk across countries. Similarly, according to (IV), the impact of FAit on risk
sharing is closely related to domestic financial markets in market-based systems.
Thus, exploring the impact of financial globalization in more detail, not only confirms
our previous results, but also reveals that the development of domestic financial markets
appears to be the driving force behind both foreign asset trade and international risk
sharing. This result supports our earlier interpretation according to which it is primarily
the tradability of risk which matters for the international allocation of consumption risk.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explore how characteristics of the domestic financial system determine
the degree to which countries can diversify risk internationally. Although risk is shared
via foreign asset trade, our results suggest that it is ultimately the domestic financial
system which drives the extent of risk sharing as the domestic financial system provides
the means to trade risk across borders. In this sense, we complement the literature which
focuses on the role of international capital flows for international consumption risk sharing
(see e.g. Imbs, 2006; Sorensen et al., 2007; Imbs and Fratscher, 2007).
We find that the overall development of the financial system does not necessarily
lead to a low exposure to shocks, but countries with developed financial markets are
able to share a larger fraction of their idiosyncratic output risk internationally. Marked-
based financial systems tend to be less exposed to idiosyncratic shocks, whereas countries
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characterized by bank-based financial systems are more exposed. We also find that foreign
asset trade is closely linked to the domestic financial system. Specifically, developed
financial markets are the driving force behind both foreign asset trade and international
risk sharing. However, trade in foreign assets is largely independent of the banking sector.
It has to be pointed out, however, that although developed financial markets lead
to relatively high risk sharing, the overall extent of risk sharing still remains limited.
Thus, even market-based countries with developed financial markets are still exposed to
a substantial fraction of idiosyncratic risk.
Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that we model the link between the domestic
financial system and international financial flows in a rather ‘reduced-form’ way. Although
our approach succeeds in separating out the influences of the domestic financial system
and of foreign asset trade, we are not able to identify more structural relationships between
these variables. An interesting direction for future research is to explicitly model these
linkages in a more detail.
Finally, we would like to point out that although the focus of this paper is on the
domestic financial system, the idea that structural or institutional aspects which are
primarily related to domestic issues may also matter for the international allocation of
consumption risk may apply more generally. Analyzing such issues in the context of
international risk sharing appears to be another interesting avenue for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
∆c˜it overall -0.002 0.019 -0.080 0.056 368
between 0.007 -0.012 0.018
within 0.018 -0.074 0.061
∆y˜it overall 0.002 0.020 -0.091 0.072 368
between 0.010 -0.011 0.038
within 0.018 -0.086 0.055
marketit overall 0.000 0.782 -2.202 1.833 357
between 0.608 -1.334 1.034
within 0.496 -1.484 1.695
bankit overall 0.000 0.389 -0.890 0.698 375
between 0.326 -0.731 0.654
within 0.220 -0.558 0.919
systit overall 0.000 0.808 -2.449 2.118 342
between 0.660 -1.631 1.416
within 0.480 -1.781 1.799
devit overall 0.000 0.389 -0.987 1.139 342
between 0.294 -0.408 0.756
within 0.258 -0.739 0.836
FAit overall 0.000 0.854 -1.339 4.557 379
between 1.074 -0.729 4.408
within 0.431 -1.158 1.252
18
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Explanatory Variables
∆y˜it marketit bankit systit devit FAit
∆y˜it 1.000
marketit 0.175 1.000
bankit -0.092 0.157 1.000
systit 0.214 0.887 -0.318 1.000
devit 0.071 0.807 0.663 0.465 1.000
FAit 0.166 0.540 0.419 0.321 0.614 1.000
Table 3: Domestic Financial System and Risk Sharing
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
∆y˜it 0.653*** 0.648*** 0.657*** 0.650*** 0.652***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.0450) (0.048)
∆y˜it ∗ devit -0.199
(0.123)
∆y˜it ∗marketit -0.124**
(0.060)
∆y˜it ∗ bankit 0.003
(0.171)
∆y˜it ∗ systit -0.127**
(0.057)
∆y˜it ∗ trend -0.021** -0.016 -0.015 -0.019* -0.016*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
N 368 340 355 353 340
Notes: The endogenous variable is ∆c˜it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects; Newey-West-
HAC-robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** / ** / * = significant at 1 / 5 / 10 percent significance
level.
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Table 4: Risk Sharing with Grouped Countries
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
∆y˜it ∗Ddevi 0.600***
(0.091)
∆y˜it ∗ (1−Ddevi ) 0.675***
(0.062)
∆y˜it ∗Dmarketi 0.553***
(0.061)
∆y˜it ∗ (1−Dmarketi ) 0.801***
(0.075)
∆y˜it ∗Dbanki 0.669***
(0.075)
∆y˜it ∗ (1−Dbanki ) 0.643***
(0.065)
∆y˜it ∗Dsysi 0.562***
(0.061)
∆y˜it ∗ (1−Dsysti ) 0.799***
(0.076)
∆y˜it ∗ trendFh -0.010 -0.016 -0.022 -0.019
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
∆y˜it ∗ trendFl -0.028** -0.034** -0.020 -0.033**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
N 368 368 368 368
p(βhF = βlF ) 0.338 0.011 0.697 0.021
Notes: The endogenous variable is ∆c˜it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects; Newey-West-
HAC-robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** / ** / * = significant at 1 / 5 / 10 percent significance
level; l = country with a below cross-country average value of the financial variable; h = country with an
above cross-country average value of the financial system variable; F = (marketit, bankit, devit, systit).
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Table 5: Risk Sharing with Foreign Asset Position
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
∆y˜it 0.667*** 0.650*** 0.660*** 0.658*** 0.646***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)
∆y˜it ∗ devit -0.163
(0.151)
∆y˜it ∗marketit -0.106
(0.069)
∆y˜it ∗ bankit 0.049
(0.164)
∆y˜it ∗ systit -0.096
(0.062)
∆y˜it ∗ FAit -0.135*** -0.082 -0.068 -0.143*** -0.088*
(0.046) (0.059) (0.058) (0.044) (0.049)
N 357 333 344 346 333
Notes: The endogenous variable is ∆c˜it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects; Newey-West-
HAC-robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** / ** / * = significant at 1 / 5 / 10 percent significance
level.
Table 6: Orthogonalization of Fit and FAit
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
∆y˜it 0.645*** 0.660*** 0.65318*** 0.641***
(0.0497) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050)
∆y˜it ∗ devit -0.276**
(0.123)
∆y˜it ∗marketit -0.147**
(0.065)
∆y˜it ∗ bankit -0.0825
(0.156)
∆y˜it ∗ systit -0.127**
(0.063)
∆y˜it ∗ uˆFit -0.082 -0.068 -0.143** -0.088
(0.067) (0.062) (0.057) (0.054)
N 333 344 346 333
Notes: The endogenous variable is ∆c˜it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects; *** / ** / * =
significant at 1 / 5 / 10 percent significance level. As uˆFit is a generated regressor, bootstrapped standard
errors are shown (a non-parametric bootstrap over countries with 1000 replications is performed).
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